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Abstract - Ingrid Robeyns argues that there is a point at which increasing one’s
income no longer increases one’s quality of life. Her argument states that given better
uses for this money, namely restoring political equality and meeting urgent needs, it is
morally wrong for individuals to have surplus money, which is money beyond that
which is needed to live a good life. Therefore, Robeyns argues that surplus money
should be taxed at a rate of 100%. The original argument only applies to individuals
with excess wealth. However, there is no reason why it should be restricted only to
people. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that corporations have free speech rights, building on previous cases that
gave corporations protection under the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Given that corporations have rights similar to people, should they be
held to the same consideration of surplus economic value? Just as Robeyns argues
that super-rich individuals have surplus money, so do mega-corporations have wealth
beyond their use. I call this argument “corporate limitarianism”. In this paper, I apply
Robeyns’ arguments for economic limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and
the argument from unmet needs, to corporations. In the case of urgent needs, I also
look at the expanded causal role of mega-corporations in creating and contributing to
these issues and how it supports the corporate limitarianism argument.
Keywords - Corporations, Economic limitarianism, Corporate rights

Introduction and Background
A woman walking down a city sidewalk spots a dollar bill lying in the street.
Does she stop to pick it up? It depends how much money she has. Let’s say she has
ten dollars in her wallet. An increase of one dollar is a large increase in her total
wallet contents, and as such it is of great use. Now let’s say the woman has one
hundred thousand dollars in her wallet (maybe in the form of an Amex card rather
than paper money). Does she pick up the dollar? Of course not, the act of going out
of her way to increase her wealth so minutely is not worth it.
This thought exercise is a great example of diminishing marginal utility. In
economics, marginal utility is the utility (or benefit) gained from consuming one
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more unit of a good. In the case of most goods, as the amount of said good
increases one receives diminishing utility from each additional unit. That means the
extra dollar is more valuable to the woman in the first example than the one in the
second. Given this, how far does utility diminish? Is there a point at which one’s
marginal utility reaches zero? If so, is wealth gained past this point better used
elsewhere?
That is one way to think about an upper limit on wealth. The other way is to
ignore personal utility functions (which vary widely across individuals) and focus on
outcomes. What does the average view of a fully flourishing life look like? Responses
vary. In a survey of Dutch households found that while there was not an exact point,
most respondents agreed that an income of between one and three million pounds
was “more than [one needs] to live a good life”.1 Though individuals may have
different opinions on what constitutes enough wealth, the majority of people agree
that the point exists. If there is a point at which one has a good life, is there a better
use for wealth accumulated beyond it?
In her paper on economic limitarianism, Ingrid Robeyns argues that having
“surplus money” (money beyond what is needed to live a good life) is not only
morally wrong, but should be taxed completely for two reasons.2 The first is that an
abundance of surplus wealth can be used to violate political equality. The second
reason is that such money, if taxed, could be used to meet urgent needs. Given these
two premises, Robeyns argues that surplus money should be taxed at a rate of 100%.
Robeyns’ original argument only applies to individuals with excess wealth. However,
there is no reason why it should be restricted to people. In Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, the United States Supreme Court ruled that corporations have
free speech rights, building on previous cases that gave corporations protection
under the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments.3 Given that
corporations have rights similar to people, should they be held to the same
consideration of surplus economic value? More generally, this paper intends to argue
that economic limitarianism should apply to not just persons, but corporations as
well. Just as Robeyns argues that super rich individuals have surplus money, so do
mega-corporations have wealth beyond their use. I call this argument “corporate
limitarianism”.
Are some businesses really too big? This question is timely, considering the
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revival of the antitrust litigation recently brought against Facebook and Google4
alongside the flourishing profits of large corporations during the 2020 pandemic
while small businesses suffered.5 Are these mega-companies justly rewarded for
innovation and success, or are they proof of a broken market system? Corporate
limitarianism aims to reframe the way this question is approached by asking not if
some businesses might be too big, but if the entire idea of giant corporations is in
itself morally wrong.
The first question one may ask is: what is surplus corporate wealth? In other
words; where does one draw the line? This is perhaps a more difficult question than
in the case of individuals. The answer is highly technical, and beyond the scope of this
paper. My main intent is to show that the premises for limitarianism, that surplus
wealth violates political inequality and that taxation of said wealth is needed to meet
urgent needs, also applies to corporations. For those reasons, there are strong moral
grounds to tax surplus corporate wealth completely. Where the line itself lies is
subject to debate, but I argue that at a certain point excess wealth (personal and
corporate) is at best unnecessary and at worst harmful for society as a whole. If such
an argument holds, it is worth asking where the line falls. However, that case would
also open the door for many redistributive programs to solve excess wealth, not just a
complete tax.
In this paper, I will begin by laying out Robeyns’ arguments for economic
limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and the argument from unmet needs,
and then apply them to corporations. In the case of urgent needs, I also look at the
expanded causal role of mega corporations in creating and contributing these issues
and how it reinforces the limitarianism argument. I will then go through potential
counter-arguments against corporate limitarianism.

Economic Limitarianism and Corporations
The democratic argument claims that surplus money can be used to
undermine democracy and the ideal of political equality. The rich can fund
political parties, set agendas, and spread their political opinions to a much larger
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extent than the majority of the population.6 Everyone can donate to political
candidates, but few have the amount of wealth to fund think tanks or news
organizations to legitimize their political opinions. Giving some people a greater
level of political expression in a democracy undermines the ideal of political
equality. Taxing surplus money would remove the excess wealth with which the
rich can exert undue political influence, and therefore restore equality.
Does this argument apply to corporations? In other words, can corporations
use surplus money to influence politics in ways that subvert political equality? Using
Robeyns’ criteria, the answer is yes. Businesses can use all four mechanisms of
political spending laid out by Thomas Christiano, which are as follows: “money for
votes, money as gatekeeper, money as means of influencing public and legislative
opinion, and money as independent political power”.7 Given enough funds,
corporations can spend large amounts of money to fund rent-seeking behavior or to
exert the political will of the company’s directors. Indeed, this is one of Robeyns’
arguments for the democracy argument for individuals. Due to the top-down nature
of corporate governance, CEOs and other high-level executives can direct firm
resources in support of their personal political ideas.8
There is also the question of who decides a company’s speech. In the current
system, executives have almost complete control over company speech. However,
that speech represents the entire company. Corporations can speak for, yet without
the permission of, workers and shareholders.9 This gives executives considerable
power and latitude in expressing their political opinions. For example, all Amazon
employees may not agree with Amazon’s lobbying efforts, yet the company speaks
with the full weight of its shareholders, workforce, and company treasury.
Next there is the issue of rent seeking. In the economic sense, rent seeking
describes when a corporation or individual lobbies a government to receive political
benefits in excess of what is necessary.10 If corporate wealth was taxed, businesses
would no longer have surplus money to spend on lobbying and rent capture. In this
case, business political spending can be thought of as a form of corruption, as
businesses use lobbying to gain access to or protection from the government that
smaller businesses or individuals cannot receive. There are numerous examples of
such lobbying. Yu and Yu show that firms who lobby are less likely to be
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investigated for fraud.11 Duchin and Sosyura find a direct correlation between
lobbying expenditures and the amount of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
funding a company received.12 Firms with excess funds can use those funds to
cheat the system, instead of expanding or improving services. Smaller firms and
individuals do not have the required funds, and therefore are locked out of these
opportunities. This rent-seeking behavior is a deadweight loss, just like corruption.
This is not to say that all lobbying is immoral or indicative of illegal activity, but
curbing excess spending by large companies would also decrease abuse of lobbying
at the government level.
The second justification for economic limitarianism is the argument from
urgent unmet needs. This argument claims that if there are extremely urgent needs
present in the world, surplus money is better spent to fix those issues than to remain
with the rich. In this argument, urgent needs are specific criteria of which at least one
must be met. Without any of these criteria being met there are no urgent unmet needs
and therefore no reason to tax surplus money. These sufficient premises are as
follows: extreme global poverty, local or global disadvantages, and urgent collective
action problems.13 Given that any of these premises hold, “[these] specific needs have
a higher moral urgency than the desires that can be fulfilled through rich people’s
income and wealth”.14 As argued in her paper, each of these three conditions hold
and therefore there is an urgent need for surplus money to be taxed.
To apply the unmet needs argument to corporations requires little adjustment.
Indeed, there are very pressing urgent needs, and excess corporate wealth could be
used to solve those issues. In addition, some of the biggest issues facing humanity
can be attributed to the actions of large corporations. For example, the largest
collective action problem, climate change, is directly caused by corporate greenhouse
gas emissions. “Over half of global industrial emissions since human-induced climate
change was officially recognized can be traced to just 25 corporate and state
producing entities''.15 These corporate entities, namely large energy companies, are
responsible for the lionshare of greenhouse gas emissions. While Robeyns’ argument
makes no mention of responsibility, it is clear that a limitarian tax would have a
positive side effect of internalizing the negative externalities of climate change and
other unmet needs.
The causal role of corporations in the urgent needs premise implies an even
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stronger moral foundation for a wealth tax than it does for individuals. Robeyns’
original paper makes a special case for climate change as an urgent unmet need, and
part of the justification for taxing the super rich comes from their role in the crisis.
Not only do richer continents produce a disproportionate share of greenhouse gasses,
many super rich individuals make their fortunes by running companies that extract a
heavy toll on the environment.16 This directly applies to corporate wealth, not only in
the case of climate change. Mega corporations such as Apple, Nike, Nestlé and others
are alleged to rely on either child17 and/or forced labor18 in making their products.
Corporations are not just part of large collective action problems like climate change,
they directly take advantage and profit off of urgent needs of their own creation (or
atleast exploitation). Not only is the taxed wealth morally better off in the hands of
those who urgently need it, fairness dictates that those who create a problem have a
strong moral duty to fix it. A causal role is not necessary to the urgent unmet needs
premise, but it strengthens the argument further.

Arguments Against Corporate Limitarianism
What are the potential issues with this form of economic limitarianism? The
standard argument is that large corporations are drivers of innovation and provide
employment opportunities at scale.19 The innovation argument, particularly, has
been a long fought debate between those who think the source of innovation comes
from small or large companies. Joseph Schumpeter popularized the debate in 1909
when he claimed that small firms led innovation through “creative destruction”, in
which a large and industry dominant firm is slowly overpowered and destroyed by
smaller, more innovative firms.20 Schumpeter later changed his mind in 1943, and
academics and politicians have been unable to agree ever since. Nevertheless, given
that the proponents of large businesses argue that innovation is driven by large
firms, an economic limitarian model would deprive society of innovation and be a
disastrous policy. So, to keep corporate limitarianism intact, we must examine
whether large firms really do drive innovation.
Do large or small firms drive innovation? It seems that this question might be
looking in the wrong direction. Large businesses and small businesses may be better
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at different kinds of innovation, and there may be no clear winner between them.21
However, government funding is a common thread in innovation. Barbieri and
Bragoli find that Italian manufacturing firms that receive public funding are associated
with better innovative performance.22 Link and Scott find that public research and
development investments have positive impacts on size and success of small firms.23
A.D. Heher shows the societal economic returns from commercialization of research
performed by government funded education institutions.24 In a recent example,
pharmaceutical giants that created the COVID-19 vaccine relied heavily on research
conducted by the National Institutes of Health and Defense Department.25
Innovation and firm size seem to be less correlated than public funding and
innovation.
What does this mean for corporate limitarianism? Given a continuance of
public funding, innovation will be unaffected by a stricter tax policy. Indeed, it may
even be improved. Some research that is socially desirable yet economically
impractical, whether due to profitability or otherwise, could be funded under the
urgent unmet needs criteria. Certain technologies like plastic recycling and renewable
energy may be unattractive to companies with the means to conduct the research, yet
with corporate limitarianism the government could provide public funding for the
innovation necessary to meet these pressing needs. For example, much of existing
research in climate change mitigation is already government funded, and much more
is needed to meet the coming crisis.26 Corporate limitarianism will not stifle
innovation, it will increase it.
The next issue is a holdover from the original economic limitarianism
argument. The negative incentive objection, laid out in Robeyns’ paper and further
expanded by the work of Volacu and Dumitru, concerns the conflicting nature of the
two main premises.27 The democratic argument strongly supports a complete surplus
21

Scherer, “Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism”, Journal of Economic Literature 30, no. 3 (September
1992): 1416.
22
Laura Barbieri et al., “Public Funding and Innovation Strategies: Evidence from Italian SMEs,”
International Journal of the Economics of Business 27, no. 1 (2020): 111–34.
23
Albert N. Link and John Scott, Bending the Arc of Innovation Public Support of R&D in Small,
Entrepreneurial Firms 24 Heher, “Return on Investment in Innovation.”
24
A.D. Heher, “Return on Investment in Innovation.”
25
Arthur Allen, “For Billion-Dollar COVID Vaccines, Basic Government-Funded Science Laid the
Groundwork,” Scientific American, November 18, 2020.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/for-billion-dollar-covid-vaccines-basic-gov ernmentfunded-science-laid-the-groundwork/.
26
Patrick Avato, Accelerating Clean Energy Technology Research, Development, and Deployment
Lessons from Non-Energy Sectors, World Bank Working Paper 138. Washington, D.C. : World
Bank, 2008.
27
Alexandru Volacu and Adelin Costin Dumitru, “Assessing Non-Intrinsic Limitarianism,”
Philosophia 47, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 249–64.
Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 16 | Spring 2021

39

money tax to ensure that wealthy individuals and businesses cannot spend said
money on influencing politics. However, the urgent unmet needs argument only
weakly implies a 100% tax is necessary. In fact, if a less restrictive tax resulted in
more money being raised to solve unmet needs, the unmet needs argument would
favor that tax over a complete one.28 Research of the optimal top tax rate concludes
that for individuals a seventy to eighty percent tax maximizes revenue and minimizes
the disincentive to work.29 In this case, the argument from urgent unmet needs favors
this tax rate as it would, theoretically, raise the most money to solve said unmet
needs. However, the democratic argument insists upon a complete tax, as any
leftover income above the wealth line can be used to create political inequality. It is
this issue that breaks limitarianism in two, and must be addressed in any limitarian
argument.
If one chooses to prioritize the democratic argument over the argument for
unmet needs, the policy prescription stays the same, only it loses strength in one of its
two main premises. This is not catastrophic, only less compelling than the original
argument. However, if one favors the argument for urgent unmet needs the policy
prescription becomes less clear, bogged down in questions of optimal taxation and
open to attacks over other possible solutions that do not involve such progressive tax
structures. How to reconcile the two? First off, a crucial part of the negative incentive
argument is the research of optimal tax rates. Without this piece, both premises
support the same policy. That said, this avenue is difficult to pursue, as refuting
optimal taxation rates requires a strong economic argument.
The research of an optimal top tax rate relies heavily on the effect of past tax
decreases on government collected income. This paper will use the research of
Thomas Piketty et al. as an example of the literature on top marginal tax rates. When
tax rates decrease, Piketty et al. break down the response of top earners into a
combination of three channels, labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensationbargaining.30 The counterargument to this view is that projections of these three
variables are not accurate, and therefore the derived rate is also suspect.31 While fully
addressing this issue requires a whole paper on its own, it is important to note a
couple things. First, the optimal tax rate only partly argues that an increase in
marginal top tax rates will substantially decrease total supply of labor and therefore
tax revenues. Another response to higher taxes is to simply avoid the payments
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9966-9.
28
Alexandru Volacu and Adelin Costin Dumitru, “Assessing Non-Intrinsic Limitarianism”
29
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva, “Optimal Taxation of Top Labor
Incomes,” American Economic Journal. Economic Policy 6, no. 1 (February 2014): 230–71.
http://doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.1.230.
30
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva, “Optimal Taxation of Top Labor
Incomes”, 230.
31
Alan Reynolds, “Optimal Top Tax Rates”
Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 16 | Spring 2021

40

Corporate Limitarianism
altogether by tax avoidance or evasion. With the recent flood of literature concerning
the latter, it is safe to say that tax evasion is the favored option. Such literature
includes descriptions of the Panama papers32, tax loopholes33, and many others. Once
taking tax avoidance into account it is far more likely that when faced with
limitarianism, super wealthy individuals and corporations will turn to methods of
reducing tax incidence instead of reducing income.
This brings us to the third issue with economic limitarianism. It is a practical
matter, rather than philosophical, and applies to both individual and corporate
taxation. If a large tax on the wealthy is implemented it is likely that those individuals
will leave the country or, in the case of businesses, change their country of residence
to one with a lower tax rate. Part of having such a large amount of wealth is the
ability to easily move, and take one’s money with them. This also applies to
businesses, as many already locate their headquarters in countries with more favorable
tax rates.34 This is a large issue for limitarianism because it suggests that the main way
of coping with the new tax regime will be to leave the country. While this is a definite
issue, it is also important to note that it is a problem with implementation, not theory.
Even assuming that economic limitarianism is structurally sound, there are certainly
potential issues with implementing such a strict tax. However, the fix for such an
issue is to implement more strict procedures at tax collecting agencies, instead of
throwing out the idea entirely. Indeed, this might strengthen the need for tax agencies
to work together across countries. Urgent collective action problems are global issues,
so global action is required to fix them.

Conclusion
In this paper I argued that Ingrid Robeyns’ idea of economic limitarianism
need not stop at the individual. Corporate limitarianism is the practice of applying
Robeyns’ wealth cap to corporations. This new argument has the same premises as
the original, namely the democratic argument and the argument from urgent unmet
needs. The democratic argument expands to include undue political influence by
corporations as well as individuals, while the urgent unmet needs argument is
bolstered by the causal role that corporations play in creating and perpetuating said
needs.
After establishing the argument, I moved to potential counterarguments.
These include a lack of innovation, the negative incentive objection, and the issue of
32

Basian Obermayer and Frederik Obermayer, The Panama Papers
Jesse Eisinger and Paul Kiel, “The Top 0.5% Underpay $50 Billion a Year In Taxes and
Crushed the IRS Plan to Stop Them”
34
Nick Statt, “Google Still Exploiting Tax Loopholes to Shelter Billions in Overseas Ad Revenue”
33

Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 16 | Spring 2021

41

enforcement. I would like to note that there are several more arguments on the
benefits of large businesses, namely compounding efficiency, increased employment,
and others, but to argue each of those in full is beyond the scope of this paper.
Innovation was picked as a representative sample, but more research is needed to
settle the rest of the potential counterarguments. The more serious objections are the
negative incentive objection and the issue of enforcement, which end up being
different flavors of the same issue. Any restrictive tax is likely to encounter the
problem of enforcement, but that should not stop the argument itself from being
presented. While limitarianism in any form would be highly difficult to enact, there
are pressing issues that result from an imbalance of wealth between individuals as
well as corporations. Fixing those issues may be difficult, but the first step is to
acknowledge that it is an issue in the first place.
The goal of this paper was to examine the ethics of large corporations and see
whether there is a moral argument for curbing excess wealth. Wealth inequality is
mainly examined at the individual level, and corporate arguments tend to focus on the
results of the inequality. While there are certainly arguments to be made against large
companies for antitrust and anti-competitive reasons, this paper is meant to examine
whether there might be something inherently wrong with excessive wealth
accumulation at the corporate level. This is a stronger argument than a
consequentialist argument, as this argument cannot be brushed aside by simply fixing
the symptoms. If there is something truly wrong with excessive wealth accumulation,
the only way to fix it is to attack the problem directly.
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